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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

CPLA Chinese People's Liberation Army

CFC Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

NKA North Korean Army

NKAF North Korean Air Force

NKN North Korean Navy

KPA Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF,

and NKN)

KWP Korean Workers' Party

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROKA Republic of Korea Army

ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force

ROKN Republic of Korea Navy 1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

Burns, John F. "Korean DMZ: Gazing South, Another View." New York Times, 16 June 1985, p. A7.

During a visit to North Korea, the author traveled to Panmunjom and toured parts of the DMZ area. He describes Kaesong as "a delapidated city of 200,000" and says he observed many of the residents in the Kaesong area using ox carts. Large rocks are spread over those areas which are suitable for tank operations. This is the only observation of North Korean defenses included in the report.

"Kim Chong-il's Military Base, Force Readiness Reviewed."

Naewoe Tongsin (Seoul), 27 December 1985, pp. 1H-9H. In

JPRS-KAR-86-015, 14 April 1986, pp. 1-4.

North Korea is producing its own T-62 tanks and artillery in a continuing effort to increase the firepower available to NKA units and is said to be constructing an aircraft manufacturing facility in North Pyongan Province. So far, the NKAF appears to be the primary beneficiary of the improved military relationship with the Soviet Union. Naewoe Tongsin says that North Korea has mechanized ten NKA divisions in recent years and has moved between nine and twelve NKA divisions closer to the DMZ. The NKA is increasing the production of self-propelled artillery and now has about 1,800 such weapons in its inventory. These developments are seen as preparations for an all-out invasion of South Korea. The aircraft-manufacturing facility will eventually produce helicopters and unknown types of Soviet-designed aircraft. It is also reported that the Soviet Union delivered 26 MiG-23/FLOGGER aircraft to North Korea between May and August 1985.

"Korea (DPRK) Receives SA-3 Missiles" <u>Defense and Foreign</u>
<u>Affairs Daily</u> (Washington DC), vol. XV, no. 58, 24 March
1986, p. 1. UA10.D428

Soviet sales of SA-3/GOA surface-to-air missiles and MiG-23/ FLOGGER aircraft have increased the visibility of the Soviet Union's military aid to North Korea. A

stronger defense relationship is said to be developing between the two countries.

Lee, Eun Ho. "Arms Transfers and Arms Race in the Korean Peninsula: Implications of Resource Scarcity on the Korean Peninsula" Korea Observer (Seoul), vol. 12, no. 4, Winter 1981, pp. 374-94. DS901.K717

Superpower competition in the sale of conventional weapons is traced back to 1955. In that year the Soviet Union sold large amounts of military equipment to North Korea and several other nations. It is argued since that time that the Soviets have used arms sales to promote their influence in particular countries, including North Korea. A decline in Soviet influence in Pyongyang in the latter 50s led to cutbacks in Soviet arms sales. A renewal of Soviet military aid around 1965 is said to have justified the concurrent expansion of US military aid to South Korea. The author believes that North Korea reduced defense spending in the 1970s because it had gained military superiority over the South, but notes that South Korea then reacted by expanding the ROKA to reestablish a military balance. Lee believes that both Koreas are building up their own defense industries in order to decrease dependence on their superpower patrons and to earn foreign exchange.

"Paper Cautions Against Weakening of Will on Security." <u>Choson Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 21 March 1986, p. 2. In JPRS-KAR-86-015, 14 April 1986, pp. 45,6.

The article focuses on two points raised by South Korean Minister of Defense Yi Ki-paek during a 20 March press conference: first, that North Korea has increased the number of NKA units positioned along the DMZ; and second, that the NKA is four times larger than it was at the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The newspaper says it is a tragic commentary that both North and South Korea deploy military forces in such large numbers along an artificial border. Chosen Ilbo points out that in the event North Korea invades the South a second time, the

costs in materiel and lives are likely to be much greater than those suffered in the 1950s. The South Korean people are said to support the ROK Government and to be prepared to defend the country.

2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

Hoyt, John Williams. "Stand or Die" Army (Arlington, Virginia), vol. 35, no. 8, August 1985, pp. 56-59. Ul. A893

This article focuses on the military problems faced by US military leaders in Korea immediately following the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. The effective use of Soviet weapons and tactics by the KPA during the initial weeks of the conflict are reviewed. The inability of the North Koreans to supply their troops because of US air superiority is believed to have prevented the Communists from mounting a successful breakthrough of the Pusan Perimeter.

Suk, Chin-ha and Morrison, James, Jr. "A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Vietnam War." <u>Korea Observer</u> (Seoul), Vol. 16, no. 3, Autumn 1985, pp. 260-79. DS901.K717

Compares the military strategy of the North Koreans in 1950 to that used by the North Vietnamese in the 1960s and 70s. The following reasons are given for North Korea's failure to bring South Korea under Communist control. First, the North Koreans opted for a quick military solution rather than choosing to promote the development of a cohesive Communist underground in the South. Second, most South Koreans supported the US throughout the conflict, thereby refuting North Korean Premier Kim Il-song's claim that reunifying Korea under Communism was a popular cause. Third, the US was able to mobilize international opinion in its favor during the early stages of the war. The North Vietnamese takeover of South Vietnam is said to have succeeded because the southern-based Viet Cong built a viable political organization, while the South Vietnam and US Governments were unable to sustain adequate levels of popular support in-country or abroad.

3.	NORTH	KOREAN	ARMY	STRATEGY		SINCE	KOREAN	

Baek, Jong-chun. "The Conflict in the Korean Peninsula, 1961-1970." Korea Observer (Seoul), vol. 14, no. 4, Winter 1983, pp. 391-416. DS901.K717

During the 1960s, North Korean leaders followed a military strategy which prepared the NKA for both offensive and defensive operations. Offensive tactics focused on bringing about the conditions in South Korea for a Vietnam-style guerrilla war. However, North Korea's efforts to subvert the South Korean Government failed and may even have helped President Park Chung Hee to solidify his political control and promote the expansion and modernization of the ROKA. Defensive tactics have emphasized turning the entire country into an impregnable fortress. The article includes tables on North and South Korean military expenditures in the 60s and the military balance of forces in 1970.

"Exportation of Violent Revolution and Strengthening the Ability for International Revolution." <u>Pukhan</u> (Seoul) vol. 12, no. 11, November 1983, pp. 58-70. In JPRS-KAR-84-005, 24 January 1984, pp. 37-54.

North Korea's export of terrorism to South Korea and other countries, and its extensive preparations for the use of guerrilla warfare in South Korea, are viewed as two parts of Pyongyang's long range strategy for bringing South Korea under Communist control. Terrorist attacks against South Korean leaders, such as the October 1983 assassination attempt on South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan which resulted in the death of 17 South Korean officials, are perpetrated to weaken Seoul's political institutions and to promote an atmosphere of confusion and unrest throughout the ROK. Pukhan describes Pyongyang's sizeable forces for unconventional warfare and suggests that terrorism is being used as a stepping stone to the promotion of a guerrilla war in the south. There are two tables. Table One is entitled "Infiltration Capability of North Korea's Special Attack Units," and Table Two is a chronology entitled "North Korea's Export of Violent Revolution."

"North Korea's Recent Military Trends." <u>Tonga Ilbo</u> (Seoul), 20 March 1986, page number not reported. In <u>Press</u> <u>Translations</u> (US Embassy, Seoul), 21 March 1986, pp. 1-2.

A review of South Korean Defense Minister Yi Ki-paek's 20 March press conference in <u>Tonga Ilbo</u> supports the ROK Government's position on the threat posed to South Korea by North Korean forces, but states that this menace has been prevalent for more than 30 years. The influential daily calls on the Government to avoid using scare tactics and to concentrate instead on taking whatever measures are necessary to provide for a strong defense. The Korean daily also voices support for continuing Exercise TEAM SPIRIT, held each year in South Korea. The editorial implies that South Koreans have no need to fear that the US will take advantage of military cooperation to increase its political influence with the ROK Government.

Park, Yong-ok. <u>Korean-Japanese-American Triangle: Problems and Prospects.</u> Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, P-7138, 1985. v. 35pp.

This paper assesses the pros and cons of strengthening US, South Korean, and Japanese military cooperation for the purpose of deterring Soviet expansionism. According to the author, current political trends indicate that Pyongyang and Moscow will continue to pursue their rapprochement for the following reasons: the DPRK needs Soviet weapons to maintain military superiority over the ROK; Soviet and North Korean leaders have similar threat perceptions concerning US military cooperation with Japan and South Korea; and both countries are apprehensive about China's expansion of its relations with the West. If the US, Japan, and South Korea establish a formal trilateral defense organization in the future, this action is likely to further enhance Soviet influence over North Korea. Accordingly, Park recommends that the US continue to use the bilateral defense treaties it has with Japan and South Korea as the legal basis for promoting regional security. Japanese-Korean bilateral defense cooperation, although desirable, should be developed slowly.

Paul, Anthony. "The Politics of Death" Asiaweek (Hong Kong), vol. 10, no. 25, 22 June 1984, pp. 38-9. DS1.A715

Two North Korean intelligence agents, who were both captured while trying to infiltrate into South Korea in December 1983, are interviewed by Asiaweek concerning their training and observations about the situation in North Korea. Chun Chung-nam and Lee Sang-gu were members of a small commando force controlled directly by the Korean Worker's Party. This force is said to be separate from the large commando organization under the control of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces which comprises about 100,000 personnel. Commando training in the Party's intelligence organization is said to include three years of college and three years of extensive training in subjects such as martial arts, use of weapons, underwater swimming, and clandestine communications. The mission of this organization appears reportedly is to maintain contact with North Korean intelligence operatives in South According to Chun and Lee, financial incentives and ideological persuasion are used to promote loyalty to the regime. When capture is imminent during an intelligence or terrorist mission, North Korean commandos are under instructions to commit suicide. Asiaweek suggests that North Korea's insistence that individual honor requires absolute obedience and sacrifices for the regime is reminiscent of the training provided to Japanese military personnel in the 1930s and 40s.

"Special Force Formed in DPRK With US Helicopters." <u>Kyonghyang</u>
Sinmun (Seoul), 24 March 1986, p. 1. In JPRS-KAR-86-015,
14 April 1986, p. 5.

North Korea is said to be forming a commando unit that will use US-manufactured helicopters to infiltrate and cause confusion in South Korea in the event of hostilities. The report says that 85 Hughes 500-MD helicopters have been moved to the Pakchon area north of helicopters have been moved to the Pakchon area horth of Pyongyang. NKA Special Purpose Forces are known to have training facilities in the vicinity and it is believed training facilities in the vicinity and it is believed that some of these units are using the 500-MD in their training programs. North Korea apparently hopes that the training programs. North Korea apparently hopes that the operated by the ROKA will enhance the success of

infiltration efforts during combat. The Japanese daily Sankei is cited as the primary source.